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following reason. Initially, old version of Android showed significant security vulnerability; however, the following Android types exhibit adequate security level. This research employed new Android version, Lollipop, having better security level. A question needed to be answered is whether the types of attack and malware characteristics will exactly identical in different Android version. Thus, in responding to this question, the research performed analysis process on Uapush malware reported the biggest infection in 2016 for comparing between KitKat and Lollipop Android version.
Uapush.a is a malware included in adware Trojan Android having high level of threat, sending Short Message Service (SMS) messages, and stealing private information such as IMSI, IMEI, important information from a device, bookmarks and call history sent to C&C server in China. This type of malware is based on C&C located in China [5] .
Research Method
Testing was performed to test the superiority of Lollipop and KitKat. Furthermore, this testing was conducted to answer the existing problems often found in different version of Android system operation related to malware infection; hence, compatibility testing was conducted, static and behavior analysis.
The testing itself had been designed to recognize the malware characteristics of Uapush on Android. The research ran using an Android emulator having similar functions to the original system. There were two methods combined to achieve more complete results. The first method employed was behavior analysis being an Android analysis technique running an application presumably infected by malware in the emulator; afterwards, the static analysis will be conducted by reading the application's source code presumably infected by malware [6] .
Before installation, implementation and testing process were implemented, the system design and topology were developed. This system design would simplify the implementation and testing processes in analyzing Uapush-type malware. The following Figure 1 illustrates the system design.
General System Design

Figure 1. General System Design
Based on Figure 1 , the research utilized victim smartphones, with rooted process and without rooted process. In order to simplify the architecture, it employed system operations in the form of virtual machine installed by those system operations. The input of this research is an Android application presumably infected with Uapush-type malware. Moreover, two analysis methods were employed using static and behavior analysis, commonly used in malware analysis processing. Static analysis performed in this research was conducted by decompressing the APK file and analyzing the result. Meanwhile, behavior analysis was started by running or executing the APK file into a device following by RAM cloning [7] . 
Architecture of Dynamic Analysis
Based on previously presented Figure 2 , the researcher developed virtual machines in window host, each of them installed with rooted and non-rooted Android. Each virtual machine was infected by Uapush-type malware resulting into 2 virtual machines. Subsequently, the analysis process of live response on each virtual machine infected by malware was conducted [8] . 
Research Result and Discussion
Dynamic Analysis
On this testing, a kernel module was created, and the results from compile LiME were stored into the devices. The following command was used to run kernel module [9] . $adb push lime-goldfish.ko /sdcard/lime.ko $adb forward tcp:4444 tcp:4444 $adb shell insmod /sdcard/lime.ko "path=tcp:4444 format=lime" & After running decompile LiME in the devices, the file would be accessed by suing Netcat to obtain capture results from the device RAM to be processed further in the analysis. The following command was used to access the file using Netcat:
The previous command used was LiME TCP transfer to obtain the results of device RAM capture; consecutively, the scanning process was conducted for the results of RAM capture using volatile. Image RAM analysis was conducted to determine the characteristics from the calculator application infected by Uapush-type malware having characteristics of command and control server and investigated malicious commands to steal IMEI and IMSI. Furthermore, observing open file and running process executed by a malware infected application became two processes conducted in this research. The analysis results are presented in the following section.
Network Analysis
Analyzing process in network is necessary because several types of malware do communication through network. Such communication will be restored in RAM. Therefore, comprehensive study to analyze operating system and reverse engineering is required, volatile memory can be the substitute to analyze this case.
There were two plugins used, linux_route_cache plugin employed to observe network route running in the device and linux_arp plugin to observe default gateway. Table 1 presents the results of these examinations [10] . Who is informed C&C Server of Uapush-type malware was located on 200 Changhou Road, Shanghai, China.
IMEI and IMSI Analysis
Linux_yarascan plugin was used to identify and obtained the proof that the application had been infected by Uapush malware having previously installed in the device. The results are presented by Table 2 .
From the previous results, the calculator application after being installed altered its name to kfines.RealCalc using a process running on PID 1323 having sub-process address of 0xb3f4b854 and 0xb3f4b803. It contained commands to acquire some device information such as IMEI and IMSI. 
Open File Analysis
In order to identify the process to opening files in the infected application, the researcher utilized linux_lsof plugin. The results are presented by As informed by the results, the calculator application had completed 29 open file processes with PID process 1311 having address on 0xd802f400. Afterwards, the following analysis process on every open file process executed by the application can be implemented in order to identify each activity from every open file process conducted by the application infected malware. From the result showed in Table 4 , RAM Uapush run on Android Lolipop with size of 796.9 MB and named as lime.lime was aimed to perform offline analysis, in order to prevent data alteration from Uapush-infected file through network. Therefore, Md5hash could help to prevent significant change from backed-up RAM image.
Network Analysis
Linux_route_cache plugin was used to examine the network gateway running on the device, and linux_arp plugin was used to identify its default gateway. The results are presented by Table 5 . From the results, it was identified from the existing route cache in the device that IP 117.135.141.99 conducted network route configuration in the device using gateway 10.0.2.2 as the gateway from device default to give access to IP 117.135.141.99 to communicate and to collect data from the infected device. The results after checked using Whois are as Figure 5 . Who is informed that the C&C Server of Uapush-type malware was located on 200 Changhou Road, Shanghai, China.
IMEI and IMSI Analysis
Linux_yarascan plugin was used to identify and acquire proof that the application infected by Uapush malware installed in the device. The results are presented by the following Table 6 . From the previous results, the calculator application after being installed altered its name to kfines.RealCalc using a process running on PID 1323 having sub-process address of 0xb3f4b854 and 0xb3f4b803. It contained commands to acquire some device information such as IMEI and IMSI.
Open File Analysis
In order to identify the process to opening files in the infected application, the researcher utilized linux_lsof plugin. The results are presented by Table 7 . As informed by the results, the calculator application had completed 27 open file processes with PID process 1323 having address on 0xd802f400. Afterwards, the following analysis process on every open file process executed by the application can be implemented in order to identify each activity from every open file process conducted by the application infected malware.
The Comparison of Uapush Characteristic between KitKat and Lollipop
The following parameters show the comparison results on Uapush characteristics. 2. The comparison of process executed by Uapush. Figure 6 illustrates that Uapush in KitKat has more injected code and mutexes compared to Lollipop. This condition is caused by more fragile security system in KitKat and imperfect 
Figure 6. Comparison of Uapush Malicious Process
Testing Static Analysis
Static analysis becomes the second stage in malware analysis. It was started by choosing or finding application presumably infected with Uapush malware, the application was downloaded from http://www.down20.com/f-883953215. An android application detected to be infected by android malware would be analyzed using static analysis. The application infected by malware having APK extension renamed into ZIP extension. Afterwards, it was extracted by suing WinRAR because an APK file can be illustrated as an archive (a ZIP file) containing Dalvix Executable File (with DEX extension). The result of this extraction contains some files having files with DEX extension. Those DEX files, after that, were converted into JAR format using Dex2jar resulting a file with JAR extension.
The last step was decompiling JAR file using JD-GUI in order to be compatible with all Java source codes examined and analyzed to detect android malware infection. This malware is commonly embedded in the main application's class file or -in some cases -a specific root. Subsequently, the malware process in the android system would be analyzed. Finally, analyzing the resulting effects to the android system was conducted.
Analysis Process
On the previous process using dynamic analysis, the RealCalc.apk application would be scanned to detect malware. From the previous analysis results, the application was detected to be infected by malware with abnormality in some required permissions.
Figure 7. Detail Permission on File RealCalc.apk
The researcher performed analysis to RealCalc.apk application using some computer forensic tools. Renaming APK extension into ZIP extension was the first process conducted. RealCalc.zip file, as the result, was then extracted using WinRAR software generating some files having DEX extension.
Utilizing Dex2jar software, those DEX files were converted in the command prompt window generating a JAR file. The last process was decompiling JAR file using JD-GUI to examine the whole Java source code in the RealCalc.apk application. Figure 7 presents class file named Pushservice.class, actually unnecessary in RealCalc.apk application. As presented in Figure 8 , a source code containing "TelephonyManager" having function to gather IMEI (International Mobile Equipment Identity) and IMSI (Information Mobile Subscriber Identity) data from the Android infected by Uapush malware.
After reading IMEI and IMSI data, this malware collected these data. Both IMEI and IMSI are personal identity from every cellular device including an Android device. The information regarding IMEI and IMSI in an Android device was sent to a server having IP 117.135.141.99 with PORT 9000.
Figure 9. Script Used to Steal IMEI and IMSI Information from the Android Device
In the case of RealCalc application, the android malware started to be active after installed and run in the android device. The Uapush malware then read and collect IMEI and IMSI information from the infected device undetected by the user.
From those conducted analyses to the Java source code of RealCalc.apk application, this research summarized the malware processes infected RealCalc.apk application. This malware was active after RealCalc.apk was installed in the android device. Moreover, it ran malicious commands as well as new service in the device installed with RealCalc.apk.
Conclusion
The conducted implementation and testing results from the final paper entitled "Analysis of Uapush Malware Infection using Static and Behavior Method on Android" presents results as follows: 1. Malware analysis using image RAM capture results obtained from LiME in an Android should be implemented by developing kernel according to the device version used in the research resulting accurate data to illustrate the whole system activity. 2. Malware analysis using static method reveals more complete results to illustrate the workflow of an application before running. 3. By using malware characteristics, the analysis process is important to examine the overall malware activity in the system. All malware characteristics were identified in this research from behavior analysis. 4. The research shows the comparison discrepancy in the number of malware in the Android system between KitKat and Lollipop. The number of mutexes and malicious processes in KitKat is considered higher than those of the Lollipop presented by Graphic 1. This condition is caused by weaker security system in KitKat; hence, malwares can easily multiply the number of mutexes by camouflaging themselves in different processes.
